That Time When I Was Suddenly Reincarnated in a Fleet Battle

Chapter 23 - Not Enough is Not Enough

"I won't desire it until I win."

"Luxury is the enemy."

"A drop of oil, a drop of blood."

"Advance, a hundred million balls of fire."

These are slogans of wartime campaigns that I despise. They reek of totalitarianism. However, amidst them, there are words that I want to acknowledge or, to be precise, words that I want to carefully consider.

"Not enough ingenuity is the lack."

These might be the perfect words for me now. During dinner yesterday, I spoke only half of what I wanted to say to Admiral Yamamoto, knowing well that it would sour his mood. There were more things I wanted to say, but I didn't have the mental fortitude to keep delivering harsh words to a Navy Admiral, especially someone I just met. So, after dinner, I requested to convey something that was difficult to explain in words through a written document to him. Now, I am using the writing tools prepared by his aide to tackle the challenging task of composing a document, which I am not good at.

The first thing I wrote about was the establishment of an early warning system. Whether it's an aerial battle at sea or an air-to-air battle between land bases, the most crucial thing is to detect the enemy's attack at an early stage. The sooner we know about the enemy's attack, the more reaction time we have. This allows us to effectively utilize interception forces, avoiding the embarrassing situation of losing valuable aircraft on ships or on the ground. Due to the disparity in national power, the Japanese naval aviation forces were inevitably outnumbered against the Allied forces. Therefore, efficient use of these forces is essential. What I referred to was the concept of an effective air defense system used in the air battles over mainland Britain. The use of radar and aviation radio for air control has long been mastered by the UK and Germany. In contrast, the Imperial Navy has not yet fully implemented these technologies. In fact, whether on ships or land bases, except for a few, radar is not widespread at all, which is a separate issue. As for this air control, I illustrated the concept and included rough drawings of IFF and PPI scopes.

Next, I wrote about the key to gaining air superiority: fighter planes.

In the Pacific War, the Imperial Army rapidly introduced new models such as the Ki-43 (Type 1), Ki-44 (Type 2), Ki-61 (Type 3), and Ki-84 (Type 4) fighters. In contrast, the Imperial Navy fought almost the entire war with the Zero. Of course, there were other models like the Raiden, Shiden, and Shiden Kai, but the combined total of these three models barely exceeded 2.000, and considering their operational rates, it was almost negligible. Therefore, currently, the Navy has only two types of aircraft: the Zero and the outdated A5M (Type 96 fighter).

The latter will be set aside since it will become obsolete. It's difficult to compete with new 2.000 horsepower-class fighters like the P-38 and F4U with the slow, poorly armed A5M. In that case, our only hope is the Zero fighter, but for the time being, I am considering focusing on modifying it to accommodate the Kinsei engine. If we want to equip the Zero fighter with powerful weapons and bulletproof gear, the performance degradation is significant with the small-displacement, low-torque Sakae engine.

On the other hand, I intend to immediately appeal for the cessation of the development of the Experimental Type 14 local defense fighter, which later became the J2M Raiden, and the Experimental Type 17 carrier-based fighter, which will be known as the A7M Reppū. The development of the local defense fighter and the next-generation carrier-based fighter, as well as the modification of the Zero, by the poorly-equipped Navy-affiliated manufacturer, is overwhelming. Regarding the replacement for the Raiden, it would be ideal to receive only the airframe portion of the Ki-44 Shōki, or, if possible, the Ki-61 Hien, which is about to start production soon. With the former, the airframe and engine remain as they are, while with the latter, the Kinsei engine would be installed. As for the Hien, if we start working on it now, we might get a degraded version of the Ki-100 (Type 5) fighter about a year and a half earlier than in reality. Although the modification will start early, the Kinsei engine will be of the 50 series rather than the newer 60 series that produces 1.500 horsepower. However, the decrease in performance, including maximum speed, should not be significantly large.

Well, that's fine up to this point. The problem lies with the aircraft that will follow these. Towards the end of the war, both the Navy and the Army deployed new fighters, the Shiden Kai and the Ki-84 Hayate, but neither could fully demonstrate their capabilities due to issues with their engines. They suffered from the troubles of the Homare engine, which aimed for 2.000 horsepower with a mere 36 liters of displacement. While the Homare engine was generally well-made, building and maintaining a normal engine was a daunting task for Japan at the time. Some aviation units with ample high-performance oil and spare parts maintained a high operational rate, but many other units were not so fortunate. In such units, even if they managed to fly, many aircraft could not demonstrate the rated output, resulting in a considerable disadvantage against American fighters equipped with similar 2.000 horsepower engines.

On the other hand, surprisingly, towards the end of the war, the Ki-43-III Hayabusa equipped with the Sakae or the Ki-100 equipped with the Kinsei gained a good reputation among frontline pilots. Pilots who engaged in fierce battles on the front lines with the Ki-43-III claimed it could compete with the P-51, and test pilots praised the Ki-100, stating it surpassed not only the F6F but also the Hayate. Alternatively, if the Homare were functioning well, the Hayate and the Shiden Kai would likely surpass the Ki-100. However, with the Homare having issues, neither the Hayate nor the Shiden Kai could realize their full potential. On the battlefield, a well-rounded average aircraft is far more useful than an incomplete masterpiece.

Also, this is not a fighter, but while we're at it, let's quickly switch the D4Y Suisei from liquid-cooled to the air-cooled Kinsei. Although the installation of the larger air-cooled engine will cause a slight decrease in top speed compared to the slim liquid-cooled engine, the operational rate will undoubtedly improve. After all, what matters most for combat machines is functionality. With this, the Zero fighter, the Ki-100 imitation, and the Suisei can all be standardized with the Kinsei, making production, transportation, and maintenance extremely manageable.

On the other hand, the Reppū, a carrier-based fighter like the Zero, will not match up to its contemporary, the F8F Bearcat, even if it is developed. It's doubtful whether we can complete the aircraft by 1945, even if we work hard from now on. Moreover, even if completed, it may be inferior not only to the F8F but also to the matured F4U Corsair. Unfortunately, considering the timing of its introduction, it seems the Reppū can only shine in alternative history scenarios.

By the way, I don't think there will be much of a problem adopting Army aircraft. There is a precedent for this, as before the war, the Ki-15 (Type 97) command reconnaissance aircraft was adopted as the C5M (Type 98) land reconnaissance aircraft. During the war, there were even plans to exchange land reconnaissance planes and seaplanes, or fighters and carrier-based attack planes. Therefore, we can receive the Hien's airframe and provide the Navy with the aircraft the Army desires, such as seaplanes and carrier-based attack planes that they may have wanted but didn't possess.

There are many things to write about beyond fighters. Particularly urgent is anti-submarine measures. Overcoming the flaws in torpedo fuzes and preparing for the intense attacks of American submarines, starting with the mass deployment of the Gato-class, is an urgent task. The submarine detection capability of Japan's destroyers specialized in fleet battles, or torpedo battles, is low. This is partly due to the poor performance of sonar systems, but on the other hand, the significant noise generated by their own hulls and engines also plays a major role. Although different in class, an escort ship that underwent noise reduction measures significantly extended its detectable range. The same should be applicable to destroyers. On the other hand, if submarines undergo noise reduction measures, our stealth capabilities will significantly increase.

And there's more to consider, such as weapons to be developed, equipment to be improved, and modifications to fleet formations and naval organization. I have already outlined them in writing, starting with the highest priority items. Since I can apply hindsight, I know what needs to be done. The blueprint for weapon development, its operation, and an efficient organizational structure are clearly drawn in my mind. Therefore, the effort to brainstorm ideas can be significantly reduced. However, the number of things to consider is too vast.

"There's no end to this," I sighed for what might be the umpteenth time on this day.